Here's a not so quick video to share some context on STOW-TT. It is only meant to give stakeholders a little more context around why it exists and what are some of the underlying concerns that have resulted in this most recent pronouncement by the Government.

The fastest way to kill learning in a high-risk environment is by asking: "Why didn't you follow the procedure?" In a refinery, a logistics firm, or a major construction site across the Caribbean, the most critical risk control you have is the person doing the work. They are the only ones who truly know the messy reality of work-as-done . But they will only share that truth—that the tool was wrong, the schedule was impossible, or the procedure was unsafe—if they feel psycholo

On the night of February 10th, 1964 , two Royal Australian Navy vessels — the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne and the destroyer HMAS Voyager — were conducting night flying exercises off the coast of Jervis Bay. At around 8:56 p.m. , the Voyager was instructed to take up a “plane guard” position — a routine maneuver to trail the carrier and retrieve aircrew in case of emergency. But what followed was anything but routine. The Voyager unexpectedly turned toward the Melbourne

Stop evaluating your safety processes with compliance alone. A 2008 academic paper by Mengolini and Debarberis on safety in complex systems suggested we must link Human and Organisational Performance (HOP) directly to our safety outcomes to truly measure effectiveness. This is exactly why simply checking off a procedure box is a poor measure of safety. In a plant environment, the real safety process is the work-as-done—how your people navigate the daily pressure points, trad

Summary On March 28, 1979, the Unit 2 reactor at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania suffered what would become the most serious accident in U.S. commercial nuclear history — a partial core meltdown. It began with something that looked routine: a secondary cooling pump tripped. But a small mechanical fault — a pressure relief valve that stuck open — allowed coolant to escape. In the control room, operators were faced with confusing, incomplete data. They believed the system had

Stuff goes wrong—missed hand-offs, fuzzy briefs, tech hiccups. We don’t hide it; we learn from it. ICAM gives us a clean way to do that without blame. We collect the facts (timeline, artefacts, short interviews) and map them to four buckets: Absent/Failed Defences (A/FD):  What barrier was missing or didn’t work? Individual/Team Actions (I/TA):  What people did, saw, or assumed in the moment. Task/Environmental (T/EC):  Conditions, tools, constraints that shaped the work. Org